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Group trust yields improved scalability and anomaly 
detection for P2P systems
Abstract - This paper implements an existing computational model of trust and reputation 
applied to a P2P environment, and extends the approach using a novel group trust calculation 
that demonstrates improved scalability and anomaly detection for P2P systems. Our analysis is 
based on results obtained by simulating a P2P environment using the JXTA open source platform. 
A trust and reputation model was implemented in the same platform, allowing to constructing 
a baseline for the behavior of the nodes using combined trust and reputation coefficients in a 
scenario without malicious nodes. Then simulations were conducted with malicious nodes and 
the effect of trust and reputation factors were analyzed regarding their influence on the anomaly 
detection capacity and scalability in P2P communications. Several simulation scenarios were 
configured and explored, considering the presence of different number of malicious nodes in the 
P2P environment, with both constant and variable behavior. Other scenarios included calculations 
of combined trust and reputation for node groups. The results show that group trust ensure more 
interactions among nodes, even in the presence of a large number of malicious nodes (60% of the 
total), besides providing focused identification of malicious nodes inside groups.
Key words: botnets, DNS, denial of service 
1 - Introduction
The problem of node authentication is one 
of the main security issues in peer-to-peer 
(P2P) systems. With advances in distributed 
systems technology, thousands of machines 
may potentially comprise a P2P overlay network, 
allowing malicious nodes to act among and 
possibly harm normal nodes. Current research 
aims to provide secure interactions among nodes 
through protocols that enable authentication 
and establish a distributed trust and reputation 
database [1] [2] [3].  In this paper, we discuss how 
security issues of P2P systems can be addressed 
by constructing interaction rules based on trust 
and reputation. We also show that extending the 
focus to group trust brings better scalability and 
anomaly detection to P2P systems. 
The test environment used here was 
configured for simulations of a P2P system 
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using the JXTA platform [4]. This P2P system is 
associated with the TRAVOS trust and reputation 
model, as proposed by [1], and implemented in 
the same platform. This allows us to construct a 
baseline for the behavior of the nodes using trust 
and reputation models that we can then use to 
explore factors that affect P2P communications. 
Previous simulations considered factors such as 
appropriate utilization of trust and reputation 
concepts, calculation of trust coefficients, network 
convergence regarding reputation values, system 
performance, and existence of malicious peers 
and the initial configuration of node behavior in 
peer groups. 
This paper is organized as follows. In section 
2 we present a review of trust and reputation 
concepts and the model used in our work. In 
section 3 we discuss the main characteristics 
of the JXTA platform [4] and consider decisions 
regarding distributed environments based on 
this platform as well. In section 4 we propose a 
group trust approach, and in section 5 we present 
our implementation and analysis of the results. 
Finally, we conclude our work in section 6.
2 - Trust and Reputation Concepts
The concept of trust described here refers 
to an agent making decisions and interacting 
successfully with other agents, even in a dynamic 
and uncertain environment [1] [5]. According to 
Patel [1], the concept of trust in computational 
relations deals with operations such as the 
optimized selection of communication partners, 
the delegation of functions to individuals, and 
the establishment of agreements between two 
or more members of the network prior to an 
interaction or communication.
Gambetta [6] defines trust as a particular 
level of subjective probability that an agent can 
evaluate in order to judge if another agent (or 
group of agents) will perform a particular action. 
This is computed before the evaluating agent 
can monitor such an action, such that the results 
will affect the evaluating agent’s decision about 
performing the action. According to Marsh [5], 
this definition permits a quantization of trust 
between zero and one, representing the degree 
of trust that an agent (truster) can evaluate by 
directly interacting with another agent (trustee).
The concept of reputation represents a form of 
indirect trust and involves asking for the opinion of 
other parties who have previously interacted with 
the trustee in the past. Patel [1] defines reputation 
as the common opinion of others regarding an 
entity, which may be used in the absence of trust 
formed from direct opinions.
In the trust and reputation approach, the 
model that will execute the trust management in a 
virtual system must use both trust and reputation 
properties and the entire historical context of 
the environment to be able to perform trust and 
reputation calculations.
2.1 - Trust in P2P systems
Rowstron and Druschel [3] define peer-to-
peer as distributed systems in which all nodes 
have identical capabilities and responsibilities, 
and in which all communication is symmetric. 
The peers in a P2P system represent individual 
agents with their own interests and motivations, 
and they depend on beneficial and just relations 
to fulfill their functions in a virtual organization. 
Therefore, according to Patel [1], agents constitute 
and maintain social agreements and structure in 
a virtual community which mimics a community 
in the real world. We extend this view to our P2P 
approach.
Trust in a P2P context is also seen as the 
effect of a relation in which a peer may or may 
not satisfy the expectations of another peer 
according to a predetermined and expected 
behavior. This naturally assumes that certain 
specific functions are expected from that peer, 
such as a non-corrupted file transfer or a query 
delivery matching a predetermined level of quality. 
When the outcome of an interaction satisfies the 
expectation, then the peer is determined to be 
trustworthy.
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According to Aberer and Despotovic [7], trust 
management comprises any mechanism that 
allows peers to establish mutual trust. Therefore, 
the concept of reputation is inserted into trust 
management since whenever a peer requests the 
reputation of another, this behavior represents a 
derivative measure of the direct and indirect trust 
acquired from past interactions. 
2.2 - The TRAVOS Trust and Reputation Model
The trust and reputation model used in this 
paper is based on the Patel approach to trust, 
which is called the Trust and Reputation model for 
Agent-based Virtual Organisations (TRAVOS) [1]. 
This approach was built to establish direct and 
indirect trust values among the relations between 
machines in a grid-like virtual organization. We 
chose this algorithm for our study because it 
provides a framework for P2P environments 
to calculate trust in direct interactions and to 
calculate reputation in the absence of direct trust 
experience. The extension of this approach for 
interactions among groups of peers is described 
in Albuquerque [9]. 
Based on the definitions stated by Gambetta 
[6], TRAVOS is based on a probabilistic view 
of trust. It contains mechanisms to obtain a 
trust value based on past interactions and from 
reputation information obtained from agents in a 
multi-agent system.
Among the concepts central to the TRAVOS 
model, three main aspects concerning the proper 
management of trust were used as a foundation 
for tests in this paper: 
1. The history of previous interactions with an 
agent (direct trust). 
2. The opinions provided by other agents in 
the network (reputation). 
3. The combination of direct interactions with 
reputation (combined trust).
In this model, the value of direct trust is 
calculated through a Beta distribution based 
on the observations by an agent 1a of results of 
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The parameters α  and β  may be calculated by 
adding the number of successful outcomes to the 
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outcomes to the initial value of β . This formulation 
actually denotes α  and β  by αˆ  and βˆ , because 
these are assumed to be estimated values. The 
basic idea is that the most reliable evidence for 
predicting the behavior of an agent is through 
the history of past interactions with this agent. 
Unfortunately, in some cases, the assessing agent 
has limited or no experience with the potential 
interaction partner. In these cases, reputation is 
used as a means of evaluating the agent.
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However, this value of reputation will only 
be reliable if two aspects are considered. First, 
the behavior of the trustee must be independent 
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of the identity of the truster; and second, the 
reputation provider must report its observations 
accurately and truthfully.
It is also possible to combine agent-personal 
observations with the opinions provided by 
other agents. This situation represents the 
approach of combined trust. To combine the 
personal experience (direct trust) with the 
opinions (reputations), we must first enumerate 




N ) and the 
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the Beta shape parameters used to calculate the 
combined trust c aa 21 ,τ , namely
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The limitation of combined trust is that even 
using the combination of methods, there may 
still exist some agents capable of influencing the 
trust calculation through faked or inconsistent 
opinions. In response to this limitation, Patel [1] 
created a mechanism that enables the agent to 
determine the level of confidence it has in its own 
observations and then only seek the opinions of 
others if this level of confidence is insufficient.
The confidence metric
21,aaγ measures the 
probability that the actual value of 
21 ,aa
Β (which is 
the probability that 2a fulfils its obligations) lies 
within an acceptable level of error ε  about 
21,aaτ
. This level ε  influences how confident an agent 
is, given the same number of observations. If 
the number of observations remains constant, a 
higher value of ε  causes an agent to be more 
confident in its calculations than a lower value 
ofε . The parameter confidence is calculated as 
follows:
   (9)
Therefore, an agent is capable of deciding if 
it will use only direct trust or reputation, or a 
combination of the two for calculating the overall 
trust.
3. The JXTA Platform
The JXTA Project consists of open protocols 
responsible for the execution of all necessary 
functions in a P2P network, such as node 
research, resource discovery, query publishing, 
etc. All of these functions are defined in the JXTA 
framework [8] and executed through publishing 
and exchanging notifications (advertisements) 
and XML messages among peers. Project JXTA is 
based on a hybrid P2P
architecture that uses a DHT (distributed hash 
table) to store all information related to peers.
The JXTA [4] platform keeps an ensemble of 
Java open codes and enables specific codes to be 
easily added. The JXTA shell [4] is an application 
based in JXTA that simulates a command-structure 
environment similar to a UNIX shell. It allows Java 
classes to be created and added to the basic 
structure of the code, facilitating the P2P platform 
to be used for distinct studies in distributed 
environments. This therefore provides a P2P 
platform with a framework for determining trust 
and reputation in accordance with the objectives 
of our study.
In our work, we have created new commands in 
the JXTA shell in order to develop a P2P simulated 
environment system and test the TRAVOS model 
for establishing connections based on trust and 
reputation between machines.
4. Group trust approach
The concept of trust represents a unidirectional 
(1:1) relation. However, as with human 
relationships, there is no way to establish a 
communication based only on direct trust values 
in large societies. Instead, P2P networks may hold 
several, variable amount of nodes. Therefore, 
bigger networks make it more difficult to establish 
direct relations based only on direct trust and 
reputation requests. Using a group configuration 
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among the nodes then allows relations to expand 
using 1:N and N:M relations.
According to Albuquerque [9], in order for the 
group trust to reflect the experience of individual 
peers, each group must contain a leader according 
to a predefined model. As an example, the leader 
may be the most trustworthy peer in the network 
using the number of interactions and historical 
trustfulness as a baseline.
To be able to calculate the group trust, the 
leader asks for the reputation value from all other 
members of the group and calculates the average 











where j > 0.  Thus, the trust value that one 
group places in another is calculated by adding 
the combined trust of every peer in the group and 
then dividing by the total numbers of peers of the 












where x is the number of peers in the group 
and gτ is the final trust value of group g. 
There are not many algorithms that can be used 
in a group trust calculation. In the leader election 
process, most of the models are based on voting. In 
the trust and reputation approach, a consensus for 
trust and reputation is desirable in order to identify 
the most trustworthy member of the group. This 
paper focuses on an efficient manner of trust and 
reputation calculation in a P2P system. The reader 
is referenced to Albuquerque [9] for more detailed 
information about trust in group contexts.
5. Implementation and Analysis
In this section, we present the implementation, 
the test environment of the P2P communication 
system used, and the analysis of our results. The 
main configuration settings applied during the 
tests are also defined and the procedures for 
quantifying trust and reputation are given.
The tests were accomplished without 
considering the real possibility that peers may lie 
about trust values in the network. In other words, 
all peers propagated their real trust and reputation 
values, even for those with malicious behavior in 
the system. In this simulation, all participants 
made the same number of interactions, with the 
intention of trying to find standards and verify 
certain behaviors about trust and reputation 
values in the system.
Trust on the computational level also includes 
the fact that a peer may or may not correspond to 
expectations of a predetermined behavior. When 
interactions follow such rules and protocols, it 
can be determined if the peer is trustful or not. 
In our simulation, some behavior patterns 
of the peers were considered as desirable in 
a P2P system aimed at allowing file transfers 
among peers. First, there should be no errors 
in the transmission of a file, thus the file must 
arrive non-corrupted at the destination peer 
(the hash of the file is checked); Second, the 
time for transmitting the file is compared to 
predetermined levels that will determine the 
overall quality level of the transmission (the time 
in seconds for the transmission to complete). 
These parameters were chosen in order to 
simplify the P2P environment, thus allowing us 
to focus of the analysis of trust and reputation 
values during peer interactions.
5.1 - Developed JXTA Commands
We developed several shell commands in the 
course of our analysis and incorporated them 
into the JXTA shell structure. Such commands are 
recognized and executed normally by the shell 
prompt, allowing the analysis of TRAVOS in P2P 
systems to be evaluated and used for studying 
the group trust approach. These commands are 
given below.
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JXTA> trust –init peerName - Automatically 
initiates each peer in the P2P network through the 
argument peerName. It is responsible for seeking 
the peers who are members of the network, 
erasing the cache that kept the name of the peers 
from former interactions, registering the peer and 
authorizing the file transfer through SFTP. Finally, 
the command creates a directory named Tables 
which will store the trust values of the peers.
JXTA> trust –test srcName destName filename 
– Transfers a file from one peer to another 
using SFTP. It is also responsible for preparing 
the destination peer to receive the file, and for 
calculating its hash using the MD5 algorithm. 
Each time a file is transmitted, the duration and 
speed of the transfer is calculated and the trust 
and reputation values are updated.
JXTA> trust –interaction srcName fileName 
[destName1 destName2 etc.] – Automates the 
trust and reputation tests in the network. Each 
time the command is set, a sequential interaction 
among all peers is issued by “trust –test”.
JXTA> trust –directtrust srcName destName – 
Calculates the direct trust value among two peers 
in the network using the formulas given in section 
2.2.  
JXTA> trust –reputation srcName destName 
[otherName1 otherName2 etc.] - Calculates the 
reputation of a specific peer in the network. Each 
time this command is set, several requests are 
sent from the source peer to all the other peers 
(except for the destination peer) in the network. 
JXTA> trust –combinedtrust srcName 
destName [otherName1 otherName2 etc.] - 
Calculates the combined trust value among two 
peers in the network. This command is used in 
the simulation to calculate the trust rate that one 
peer has for another. The parameter confidence 
is also computed in order to measure the level of 
confidence of the direct trust value.
JXTA> trust –grouptrust srcGroup srcLeader 
[srcOtherName1 srcOtherName2 etc.] destGroup 
[destOtherName1 destOtherName2 etc.] - 
Calculates the trust value one group has for 
another using the combined trust values of each 
peer in the destination group.
5.2 - Procedures, Simulations and Initial 
Settings
The simulations were executed on machines 
with the JXTA shell installed and configured. Five 
peers were set up on each machine using standard 
JXTA shell commands. Communication between 
machines was established with a Layer2 switch 
using 10/100Mbps ports. The purpose of this 
setup was to represent a P2P network connected 
directly to a LAN. The peers were configured in the 
same network segment with no additional hops. 
Each peer replied to a different TCP port between 
9700 and 9709. This is to permit the P2P network 
to establish connections on different ports.
The transfer delay and the integrity of the file 
were parameters used to decide whether a peer 
was malicious or not. The interval of time values 
for the transfer was defined after several file 
transfer tests were executed. Several interactions 
were completed for a file with fixed size (100 
Kbytes), and a standard time was then defined for 
a successful interaction. Table 1 gives the results 
of this test. Based on this information, it was 
determined that the expected transfer time of a 
file would be under 1s, a slightly-delayed transfer 
time would be between 1 and 2s, and completely 
delayed transfer time would be above 2s. The 
integrity of the received file was also defined using 
a hash calculation to verify the file’s condition. 
Table 1 – Test parameters.
The transmission time and file integrity 
measure all combinations of possible file transfer 
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situations in the system, and are described by 
variables a and b, respectively. The parameter 
P represents the weight (importance) that the 
network administrator allocates to the integrity of 
the file. In our case, a value of 0.75 was chosen for 
P because we considered the integrity of the file to 
be more important than the time for transmission. 
Quantifying the combined file transmission time 
and integrity is then done by defining
C =  P a  + ( 1 – P ) b. (1 )
Considering these initial settings, Table 2 
summarizes the possible situations that may 
occur.
Table 2 – Probable situations. 
In this simulation, values of C higher than 
or equal to 0.8 resulted in a defined successful 
interaction, causing the value of the expectation 
of the contract 
21 ,aa
O  (from TRAVOS model) to be 
equal to 1.  This indicates that the peer who sent 
the file fulfilled its obligations by delivering a 
trustworthy and high-quality file. Any other value 
of C forces a null value to 
21 ,aa
O , meaning that the 
interaction is associated with a malicious peer.
As related to the behavior of the peers during 
the tests, peers only accomplished interactions 
with appropriate parameters in order to verify the 
convergence of trust and reputation values. The 
tests started with a fixed number of malicious 
peers which was gradually increased. In this stage 
of the process, when a peer was initiated with a 
certain behavior (malicious or not), it maintained 
the behavior until the end of the tests. These 
characteristics were also implemented in the 
group approach.
In the first test, all peers of the network 
were trustworthy.  Then 20% of the peers were 
configured as malicious. In both situations, the 
values of direct trust, reputation and combined 
trust were calculated. The final stage considered 
the scenario of changing a peer’s behavior after it 
was already interacting on the network. The main 
objective was to verify if TRAVOS allowed the peers 
to realize that some members of the network 
changed their behavior and thus reacted to the 
change accordingly. In this test, all peers started 
as trustworthy but then changed their behavior at 
predetermined moment. At first 20%, then 50%, 
and lastly 70% of the peers turned malicious. 
For each situation, the values of direct trust, 
reputation and combined trust were collected for 
every communication channel.
5.3 - Results and Analysis 
Our simulations attempted to reproduce 
situations inside an ideal environment in which 
all peers initiate from within the network and 
interact with each other the same number of 
times, therefore avoiding external factors that 
could influence the tests results. To simplify the 
demonstration of our results, we denote peer1 as 
our reference peer.
The parameter ε  used for calculating the 
TRAVOS confidence was set to ε  = 0.2, indicating 
our acceptable error level for an observation. The 
confidence parameter was defined as γ  = 0.95. 
This means that if the confidence level of a peer 
is below this value, it will search for the opinions 
of other peers in the network. The values of 
the parameters γ  and ε  were defined through 
simulations from Patel [1], thus representing good 
values to simulate all features of TRAVOS.
A minimum trust value of 0.7 was set for a 
peer to consider another peer trustworthy and 
decide to continue interacting with it. For values 
below 0.7, the peer is considered malicious and 
the exchange of data among them is terminated. 
It is important to remember that this value is only 
a representative component, and may be adjusted 
according to the security or sought-after behavior 
between peers. We decided on this value because 
we desired a rigorous trust value. 
2
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5.3.1 - Trust calculation without behavior 
change
The simulation was set up assuming that each 
peer maintains its initial behavior. This means that 
malicious peers are initiated as malicious (at t=0), 
and keep the same behavior until the end of the 
interactions. In this test, peers do not keep historic 
data of trust values and the test is therefore called 
“trust calculation without historic”. Two tests were 
simulated for this scenario, using 0% and 20% 
total malicious peers in the network.
The trust coefficient is equal among peers with 
the same behavior due to the fact that all the peers 
are initiated at the same time. In a real network, 
this would not occur because peers would have 
distinct behaviors and therefore different trust 
values. Ten interactions were performed in each 
test. This number is appropriate to describe the 
behavior of the trust values in the network (every 
interaction is performed using a trust approach). 
The first simulation was treated as a baseline 
to compare all other tests. In this case, all peers 
are trustworthy and the network behaves ideally. 
The trust value initiates to null and increases 
during the elapsed time. The trust coefficient 
grows according to the Beta distribution, and the 
trust value tends to increase until stabilizing at a 
value near 1 (or a very high trust). It is important 
to remember that the coefficient will never reach 
the maximum value of 1 due to the properties of 
the Beta distribution. Figure 1 shows this initial 
configuration.
In this case, all peers answer the reputation 
request with positive values, inducing the 
combined trust values to increase faster than the 
direct trust values. During a certain moment of the 
test, an abrupt decrease of the trust coefficient 
occurs. This happens when the confidence value γ  
is larger than or equal to the established threshold 
of 0.95. When this occurs, the reputation values 
are no longer considered and the combined trust 
value is equal to the direct trust value. Therefore, 
























Figure 1 – Combined trust without malicious peers.
In the second test, 20% of the peers in the 
network are malicious. As seen in figure 2, the 
trust values remain low for malicious peers and 
increase for trustworthy peers (similar to the 
previous test). Again, the trust value relative 
to malicious peers tends to remain at a value 
near zero, but the coefficient never reaches the 























trustworthy peers malicious peers
Figure 2 – Combined trust with 20% of peers malicious.
During a particular moment of the test 
(interactions 7 and 8), an abrupt decrease of the 
trust coefficient of the trustworthy peers occurs 
and coincides with an increase of the trust value of 
the malicious peers. Again, this happens because 
this point corresponds to a confidence value 
γ  larger than or equal to our 0.95 confidence 
threshold. Therefore, in this case, trustworthy 
peers will never trust the malicious peers. 
5.3.2 - Trust calculation with behavior change
This simulation was tested in a network in 
which peers change their behavior, similar to 
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current P2P networks. All peers were initiated 
as trustworthy peers (at t=0) and some peers 
changed their behavior as interactions unfolded. 
In this test, peers keep historic data about trust 
so this data is taken into consideration at the 
moment they became malicious and the test is 
therefore called “trust calculation with historic”. 
During predetermined moments, some peers 
became malicious: first 20% of the peers (peer9 
and peer10), then 50% of the peers (peer6 
through peer10, inclusive) and finally 70% of 
the peers (peer4 through peer10, inclusive). A 
larger number of interactions were simulated in 
this test in order to better analyze the behavior 
of the trust coefficients. Figure 3 summarizes the 
behavior of the peers in this simulation through 
their combined trust values. 
Figure 3 – Combined trust with historic.
It can be seen that peer2 was the only peer 
that remained trustworthy in the network until 
the end of the simulation, thus its trust value 
was not corrupted and remained close to 1. 
The trust values of the other peers decreased at 
specific moments once their intentions became 
malicious.
5.3.3 - Trust calculation in groups
The simulation in a group context was also 
performed with two different scenarios: with and 
without behavior change. In this test, the odd 
peers constituted the source group (the group 
that requested the trust value) and the even peers 
constituted the destination group (the group 
from which the trust value was calculated). All the 
collected results are presented having peer1 as 
the reference peer. A total of twelve interactions 
were performed in each test. This number was 
considered satisfactory to describe the trust 
behavior of a determined group in the network 
because it represents 12 possible interactions 
in a real scenario. The final group trust value is 
calculated in each test.
In the first simulation, without behavior 
change, there were no malicious peers and only 
good interactions were fulfilled. The test was then 
restarted with 20%, 40% and 60% of the members 
of the group acting as malicious peers. The 
results are relative to the combined trust values 
of the peers belonging to the destination group, 
according to peer1. In the event of no malicious 
peers in the network, the group trust value is 
equal to the individual trust value of each peer in 
the group, because all members have the same 
behavior. In this case, the group is considered 
extremely trustworthy and its trust coefficient 























peer2 peer4 peer6 peer8 peer10 GroupTrust
Figure 4 – Group trust without malicious peers.
In the second test, 20% of the peers behaved 
in a malicious manner. The group trust value 
increased and stabilized near 0.8. This result has 
one malicious peer, meaning 80% of the peers in 
the group are considered trustworthy. The analysis 
shows that the increase of the trust coefficient of 
the good peers overcomes the decrease of the 
coefficient of the malicious peers. In this case, the 
group is considered trustworthy as well ( 7.0<τ ), 
despite having one malicious member. 





















peer2 peer4 peer6 peer8 peer10 GroupTrust
Figure 5 - Group trust with 20% of peers malicious.
Figure 5 shows the results for the group trust 
approach. It is important to note that this approach 
does discover the malicious peer in the group. 
Depending on the configuration, that particular 
peer can then be isolated from communicating on 
the P2P network.
When 40% of the group members are malicious, 
the trust coefficient tends to stabilize at a value 
near 0.6, representing 60% of the peers in the 
group are trustworthy. In this case, the group is 
not considered trustworthy because it is below our 
threshold of 7.0=τ . Lastly, when 60% of the group 
members are malicious, the trust coefficient tends 
to stabilize at a value near 0.4, also making the 
group not trustworthy. Figures 6 and 7 show the 
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peer2 peer4 peer6 peer8 peer10 GroupTrust
Figure 7 – Group trust with 60% of peers malicious.
During the second simulation, former 
interactions were considered and peers changed 
their behavior at predetermined moments. 
Initially, 20% of the peers (peer10), then 40% of 
the peers (peer8 and peer10) and finally 60% 
of the peers (peer6, peer8 and peer10) became 
malicious. 
Figure 8 summarizes the combined trust 
values of the destination group and of the group 
members. The trust value of the group was initially 
high (the moment in which all peers have good 
behavior). The value then started to decrease at 
the moment the first peer in the group became 
malicious. When the other peers changed their 
behavior, the group trust coefficient decreased 
faster, thus making a group with constantly 
changing behavior not trustworthy. With a higher 
number of interactions, this value tends to 
stabilize near 0.4.
Figure 8 – Group trust with historic and changing behavior.
In both simulations, the individual behavior of 
each group member influenced the trust value of 
the group as a whole. This result was acceptable 
since all peers initiated in the network at the same 
moment and interacted with each other the same 
number of times. During the times of behavior 
change, the group’s trust value was influenced. 
For instance, if a group leader realizes that their 
trust value is below expectations, it may decide 
to isolate malicious peers from the network. After 
that, the group trust value may again rise above 
expectations and result in more interactions. In 
the case that successful interactions represent 
incentives for continued collaboration, groups 
tend to maintain good behavior most of the 
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time and isolate malicious peers because they 
represent a threat to the group as a whole. 
6. Conclusion 
In our simulations, the JXTA shell appeared 
to be flexible and sufficiently structured in 
order to correctly emulate a decentralized P2P 
network, and the TRAVOS implementation was 
an effective trust and reputation model that 
gave peers the chance to react quickly (and 
with a small number of interactions) to realize 
changes in the network. However, since it has 
no means of calculating group trust and trust 
consensus, which is an open question for trust 
in distributed systems, we extended the model 
with our approach to group trust. This basic 
implementation and our extension were then 
evaluated.
The main objectives of this paper were 
fulfilled.  In particular, our approach was able 
to identify malicious peers and exclude them 
from communication. It was observed that, 
after some number of interactions, peers with 
good behavior established a general agreement 
about the identification of the malicious peers 
in the network. Therefore, malicious peers were 
isolated form further communication after a 
certain number of interactions. 
In the simulation where peers changed their 
behavior during the interactions, the network 
as a whole learned the identification of the 
malicious peers more slowly. However, within a 
reasonable number of interactions, the network 
converged to a consensus of malicious peer 
identification, again permitting their isolation 
from further communication.
Using the concept of trust in a group approach, 
the model explored in this paper could be used 
in larger and more complex P2P architectures. 
It is important to consider a leader election 
approach for the group and it must be elected 
by other peers considering the trust approach 
adopted here. It is also correct to think that 
the trust value of an older peer in the network 
should have more significant influence for the 
group trust coefficient than the trust value of 
more recent peers. Using a balanced average 
that considers the standard deviation of the 
individual trust values would result in a more 
precise group trust coefficient, thus improving 
group trust results.
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